The Philhellenic Monroe Doctrine

United States Capitol 
(freely dowloadable in PDF format here)
author: John D. Pappas

On December 3, 1822, the Congress of the Holly Alliance in Verona (October 8  December 3, 1822) concluded its proceedings. At Verona, the rulers of continental Europe decided the invasion of a 100.000-men French army in Spain, in order to crash the revolution of the Exaltados, the anti-monarchic revolutionaries in Spain. Also, at Verona, the hegemons of Europe made the grave (hubristic) mistake to consider a transatlantic joint military intervention of the Holly Alliance in the American continent, in order to re-consolidate colonial order in South and Central America: The successful Austrian invasion in Italy last year (1821) against the Carbonari, the Italian revolutionaries, along with the imminent French invasion in Spain (1823), constituted an effective reactionary counter-revolutionary paradigm, which the Holy Alliance could apply (export) into the American continentat least so the European monarchs thoughtfor crushing the rebellions that had been leading many European colonies in America to their emancipation and independence, in domino-like emulation of the momentous revolutionary paradigm of the American Revolution (1765-1783).


The response of the warring Greek revolutionaries to the reactionary deliberations and decisions of the Holy Alliance at Verona, was military:(1) On that day (December 3, 1822), they concluded the liberation (October 29 - September 3, 1822) of the first capital of Greece, Nafplion, from the Ottoman yoke, right after the destruction of the formidable 32.000-men Ottoman «Army of the 5 pashas» under Dramali (Mohamed Ali Pasha of Drama) by the 3.600-men Greek troops under Kolokotronis, the legendary Greek warlord.

The response of the United States was even more formidable, because it was geopolitical: By a twist of fate, on that same day (December 3, 1822), a philhellenic thunderbolt lightened the cloudy (or even gloomy) reactionary firmament of the then authoritarian-colonial Europe. It was a geopolitical thunderbolt that was flung from the other side of the Atlantic, by the U.S. Government, against the status quo of the European hegemons in the post-Napoleonic era.

I. Monroes philhellenic declaration (December 3, 1822)

James Monroe
5th U.S. President (1817-1825)
On that historical day (December 3, 1822), James Monroe, the 5th President of the United States (1817-1825), made an unqualified and geopolitically momentous statement in favor the Greek freedom fighters, who were then fully engaged in the Greek War of Independence (1821-1833). In his statement, Monroe announced that the U.S. favored the independence of the neonate democratic Greek State (first established on January 1, 1822): As of that day, December 3, 1822, the U.S. were looking forward to Greece becoming an independent countrynot an autonomous suzerainty within the Ottoman Empire, as Czar Alexander A΄ intended at the timeof equal station among the nations of the earth”.Monroe's statement, that was carefully worded (word-by-word), was proclaimed at the highest institutional level, i.e. in his annual (5th) State of the Union Address before the joint session of the U.S. Congress, as follows:

strong hope is entertained that these people will recover their independence and resume their equal station among the nations of the earth.

That was the first official explicit reference by a leader of an (emerging) Great Power to the national independence of the Greeks and also to their equal station at the level of international law: The U.S. was looking pragmaticallyforward to what Czar Alexander A΄ considered a chimeric idea at the time, and to what all other European rulers were then loath even to hear (let alone discuss), i.e. the national independence of the Greeks, despite the fact that the Greek fighters were fully engaged, all alone then, in a fierce and chaotic war of extermination (Finlay τΙσ171-172236-237) on land and in the seas, the Archipelago and the Ionian sea, in the southeast corner of Europe (according to the geographical characterization of Greece by the Holy Alliance in Verona), as forefighters of all Christian Europe against Ottoman theocracy, against Asian backwardness, and against Muslim expansionism (Jihadism).

Even more, by Monroe's proclamation, the United States have since emerged as the historically first Great Power whose government explicitly and officially mentioned the name Greecemore than four years before Russia and England did so by the Protocol of St. Petersburg (March 23, 1826)i.e. the first Great Power that recognized a political existence of the Greeks as a nation.

Still more, according to that Presidential declaration, Monroe praised the Greek forefighters before the joint session of Congress, with words of historical wisdom and with an enthusiastic tone that unsettled the ears and the minds of many hegemons in post-Napoleonic Europelike those of Austrian Chancellor Klemens von Metternichas follows:

One year ago Europe is still unsettled, and although the war long menaced between Russia and Turkey has not broken out, there is no certainty that the differences between those powers will be amicably adjusted. It is impossible to look to the oppressions of the country respecting which those differences arose without being deeply affected. The mention of Greece fills the mind with the most exalted sentiments and arouses in our bosoms the best feelings of which our nature is susceptible. Superior skill and refinement in the arts, heroic gallantry in action, disinterested patriotism, enthusiastic zeal and devotion in favor of public and personal liberty are associated with our recollections of ancient Greece. That such a country should have been overwhelmed and so long hidden, as it were, from the world under a gloomy despotism, has been a cause of unceasing and deep regret to generous minds for ages past. It was natural, therefore, that the reappearance of those people in their original character, contending in favor of their liberties, should produce that great excitement and sympathy in their favor which have been so signally displayed throughout the United States. A strong hope is entertained that these people will recover their independence and resume their equal station among the nations of the earth.

It is noteworthy that the philhellenic ultimatum Russia against the Ottoman Empire (6 July 1821), and thereby the threat of Russo-Turkish war (referred to in the introductory sentence of Monroe's declaration), were intended for protecting the Greek Orthodox Church and Ecumenical Hellenism (the Greek population throughout the tricontinental Ottoman Empire) primarily in non-combatant regions under Ottoman yoke, against indiscriminate Turkish reprisals in such regions for Greek victories in war zones. Still, the Russian ultimatum included verbal qualifications and conditions (explicit or implicit) as to the fate of armed Greeks (soldiers, guerillas and seamen) in war zones within the Ottoman Empire. On the contrary, the unconditional philhellenic Presidential statement of the United States (1822) pertained to the Greeks in war zones, as descendants of the ancient Greeks and forefighters of Christian Europe, with a maximalist wording as to the anticipated (positive) outcome of the Greek War of Independencean outcome that, according to the U.S. Federal Government, could soon be nothing less eventually than the national independence of Greece. In sum, that proclamation of the U.S. Government was historically the first unconditional philhellenic declaration by a leader of a great country in favor of the Greek forefighters in war zones.

John Quincy Adams
6th President  (1825-1829)
and Secretary of State (1817-1825)
of the United States.
The Presidential declaration was not merely the product of a sentimentally philhellenic predisposition of the American Government, although the U.S. foreign policy was led then by Philhellene John Quincy Adams, a prominent statesman in American History, then U.S. Secretary of State (1817-1825) and thereafter (6th) President of the United States (1825-1829). Nor was it a product of political expediency, in light of the Philhellenism that was then spreading to the U.S. electorate, even though the declaration referred explicitly to American Philhellenism at the end of the paragraph (second to last sentence). The real importance and outlook of that groundbreaking declaration was geostrategic, as demonstrated in the following year (1823): The philhellenic declaration of the United States (1822), amounted essentially to a prelude of the philhellenic proclamation of the Monroe Doctrine after just 12 months (December 2, 1823). That is, Monroe's philhellenic declaration in 1822, with all that it mentioned explicitly (concerning the national independence of liberated Greece, as a geographically small country but still of equal stature with the Great Powers) and implicitly (US potential support of the Greek revolutionaries, an option that was not explicitly precluded in the declaration), was virtually a preview of the philhellenic dimension of the Monroe Doctrine, which at the time, during the Congress at Verona and the following months, was being formulated by the leadership of the United States.

II. The philhellenic Monroe Doctrine (December 2, 1823)

The great significance of the Greek War of Independence for Europe and the world, was pointed out by President Monroe in the following year, on December 2, 1823, in a most solemn institutional context, i.e. in the main text(2) (929 words) of the geostrategically groundbreaking (anti-colonial) presidential proclamation as to the founding principles of the U.S. foreign (geo)policyprinciples that later, since 1850, were named epigrammatically as the Monroe Doctrinein Monroe's next annual (6th) State of the Union Address before the joint session of the U.S. Congress. The text of that (second) philhellenic proclamation, also handwritten by John Quincy Adams, begins with a relatively large paragraph (165 words) that refers entirely to the Greek War of Independence. That paragraph constitutes the introduction of the main text of the Monroe Doctrine, as follows:

strong hope has been long entertained, founded on the heroic struggle of the Greeks, that they would succeed in their contest and resume their equal statioamong the nations of the earth. It is believed that thewhole civilized world take a deep interest in their welfare. Although no power has declared in their favor, yet none according to our information, has taken part against them. Their cause and their name have protected them from dangers which might ere this have overwhelmed any other people. The ordinary calculations of interest and of acquisition with a view to aggrandizement, which mingles so much in the transactions of nations, seem to have had no effect in regard to them. From the facts which have come to our knowledge there is good cause to believe that their enemy has lost forever all dominion over them; that Greece will become again an independent nation. That she may obtain that rank is the object of our most ardent wishes.

The philhellenic ultimatum of Russia against the Ottoman Empire repositioned the Greek question to the epicenter of the Eastern question before the Great Powers of Europe in 1821-1822. The subsequent proclamation of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823 upgraded the Greek question even further, to the highest conceivable (global) level, i.e. on center stage of the world arena of the Great Powers: The Greek War of Independence was an emblematic paradigm of national liberation for all nations in the world. Moreover, the democratic Greek State had evolved de facto into a political projection of the democratic U.S. in the Old World, because the revolutionary Greek constitution (effected by the National Assembly of the Greeks in Astros, 1823) had many common features with that of the (democratic) U.S. rather than of any other (autocratic-oligarchic) country in Europe then, in the post-Napoleonic era. Furthermore, through the Monroe Doctrine, warring Greece was potentially a geostrategic bridgehead of the (anti-colonial) U.S. in (colonial) Europe. In particular, under the Monroe Doctrine, the U.S. would react, with all the means at the disposal of the American Government, against any further expansionist intervention of European Powers in the American continent, whether such intervention was direct (military) or indirect (political), as follows:

We owe it, therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere, but with the Governments who have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States.

In case of any indirect (politico-economic) counter-revolutionary involvement by a European Power, in any other manner”, against an emancipated-independent former colony in the American continent, the U.S. projected implicitly, as deterrent, their own resolution for indirect (revolutionary) counter-involvement in Europe, and even in asymmetrical manner, namely, by offering substantial material and economic U.S. support to the warring Greeks, in order to put into effect chaoticallyall across Europe, the Greek ethnic-liberation paradigmwhich threatened to motivate or even instigate the peoples in the multinational mosaic of Europe towards their (national) emancipation from their hegemonsto the eventual dissolution of all (multinational) empires in Europe.

Within that context, the resolution of the United States, at to its counter-offensive contingency option, underlies the emphasis of the proclamation of the Monroe Doctrine on the heroic struggle of the Greeks, i.e. Monroe's explicit and extensive reference to the Greek War of Independenceand indeed in the most prominent position of the proclamation, i.e. as an introduction to the main text of the Monroe Doctrine, which otherwise, in theory or in first reading, pertained primarily to the American (not the European) continent.

View of the United States Capitol (1806)
[painting by Benjamin Latrobe (1800-1856)].
It should be noted that John Quincy Adams, the mastermind and author of the Monroe Doctrine, had an outstanding knowledge of the vulnerability (“Achilles' heel”) of the seemingly powerful authoritarian (monarchic) regimes in mainland Europe: destabilization from within, through popular revolutions with democratic and national cause (per the Greek paradigm). Adams' knowledge of that vulnerability was not merely theoretical but also experiential, since, before taking up his duties in 1817 as U.S. Secretary of State, he had previously represented his country as the historically first U.S. ambassador in Russia in 1809-1814, i.e. in the most critical and perhaps most glorious period of Russian history up to that time. Adams was then fortunate to experience personally the titanic struggle of Russia against the Grande Armée of Napoleon and to develop, from then on, a personal relationship of mutual respect with Czar Alexander A΄. He had also obtained personal knowledge of the weaknesses of Russia, as well as those of England (where he served as U.S. Ambassador in 1814-1817) and France (where he resided during the «100 Days» of Napoleon in 1815). As result, in combination with an effective sense of measure that distinguished him (he was a classicist at an academic level, with profound knowledge of both Latin and Ancient Greek), Adams knew how to neither underestimate nor overestimate military or political threats from the Old World (Europe) against the New World (America).

III. Revolution of the nations

President Monroe, through his successive philhellenic proclamations in 1822-1823, demonstrated that the U.S. Government was the first to realize that the Greek revolution was ethnocentricbarely a social rebellion against an unpopular regime, in emulation of the (failed) French Revolutionand, consequently, that the independence of Greece would mark the beginning of a new era, in which the natural (anti-hegemonic, anti-colonial) principle of ethnicity would replace the artificial (hegemonic-colonial) principle of legitimacy. Therefore, the Greek War of Independence brought the nations of Europe and their right of ethnic self-determination, regardless of the size of every nation's population, to the fore of the European political stage. Consequently, it is from Greece were the revolution and emancipation of the nations spun off at a pan-European level, or even (given the Eurocentrism of the era) at a global level.

In that evolutionary context, the philhellenic proclamation of the Monroe Doctrine undermined and shook the very foundations of the Holy Alliance (which collapsed in the following year, 1824), and signaled the beginning of the end of allempires, i.e. not only the multinational empires (like Metternich's Austrian Empire or the Sultan's Ottoman Empire) but also the colonial empires as well, due to the two successful ethnic revolutions in the Age of Revolution(Hobsbaum 1961): the ethnogenic American Revolution in the New World in the 18th century, and the ethno-liberating Greek Revolution in the Old World in the 19th century. Indeed, as reflected on subsequent historical developments worldwide, since small Greece managed to be liberated (from barbarous imperial yoke) in the 19th century, it would thereafter be inconceivable for great India not to be liberated as well (from comparatively civilized colonial dependence) in the 20th century.

IV. Value system and name legacy

The enormous power and the chaotic dynamic of nationalism when it becomes idealistic (patriotic), are implied in the proclamation of the Monroe Doctrine, whereby the U.S. President attributed the military and naval triumphs of the Greeks, against the armies and fleets of a huge (tricontinental) empire, to the purely idealistic value system of the Greek forefighters, by his saying that “the ordinary calculations of interest and of acquisition with a view to aggrandizement, which mingles so much in the transactions of nations, seem to have had no effect in regard to them” in 1821-1823. That splendid deduction of John Quincy Adams, as to the ethno-liberating (or even chaotic) potential of (idealistic) patriotism, would be ever since, until World War II, the cornerstone of the anti-colonial foreign policy of the U.S., that for many decades was looking forward to the inevitable (or even teleological) dissolution of all colonial empires.

Another pertinent deduction of John Quincy Adams, as proclaimed in the Monroe Doctrine, is of lasting importance: President Monroe stated that the prime factors of the victories of the Greeks were “their cause and their name” that“have protected them from dangers which might ere this have overwhelmed any other people”That is, according to the view of the U.S. Government, the Greek victories in war zones were due to the idealistic ehno-patriotic cause of the Greek revolutionaries (national independence and political freedom), while the effective protection of Ecumenical Hellenism by Russia in non-combatant regions, under the shield of the Russian ultimatum (1821) and the subsequent threat of Russo-Turkish war in 1821-1826, was due to the historical name of Greece as the cradle of Western (Greco-Roman and Christian) Civilization. In sum, according to the mutual point of view shared by both James Monroe and John Quincy Adams, as far as Greece is concerned, the ethno-patriotic cause of the Greeks and their uniquely great name legacy (GreeceHellasIoniaCreteCyprusMacedonia”, etc.) are fundamental factors of national security and, as such, non-negotiable and hardly amenable to any cession, then and ever after.

Εndnotes

  1. The Greek response to the reactionary (counter-revolutionary) deliberations of the European monarchs at Verona, was not only military (the liberation of Nafplion in October 29  December 3, 1822) but had also been diplomatic: The Greek Government had managed to submit to the Congress at Veronawith the effective philhellenic mediation of Pope Pius IIIan official declaration (Δηλοποίησις”, signed on August 29, 1822) that among other issues pointed out the Ottoman genocidal threat against the Greek nation, as follows:

European TurkeyAsia and Africa are arming themselves, competing with each other to support the iron hand that has oppressed the Greek nation for so long and has been tending to exterminate that nationentirely.

(“Η ερωπαϊκ Τουρκα ᾿Ασα κα  ᾿Αφρική ξοπλζονται μιλλμεναι πρς λλλας δι ν ποστηρξωσι τν σιδηρν χερα τν καταπισασαν τοσοτον χρνον τ λληνικν θνος κα τενουσαν λως ες τ ν τξολοθρεσ.”)

Even more, the Greek response was also humanistic: Under strict orders of the Government of the neonate democratic Greek state, the liberation of Nafplion was orderly, i.e. without retaliatory massacres against the (surrendered) Turkish defenders of Nafplion. On December 3, 1822, Kolokotronis ordered the Greek troops to stay outside the gates of Nafplion, in order to avert looting or even such massacres. The Turkish defenders of Nafplion embarked on Greek ships under Greek Admiral Miaoulis, as well as on the English frigate Cambrian under Captain Hamilton, on December 12, 1822, and thereafter were transported safely to non-combatant Anatolia (to Smyrna and Kusadasi), in accordance with the terms of the pertinent treaty of their capitulation.

  1. The main text of the Monroe Doctrine:

strong hope has been long entertained, founded on the heroic struggle of the Greeks, that they would succeed in their contest and resume their equal statioamong the nations of the earth. It is believed that thewhole civilized world take a deep interest in their welfare. Although no power has declared in their favor, yet none according to our information, has taken part against them. Their cause and their name have protected them from dangers which might ere this have overwhelmed any other people. The ordinary calculations of interest and of acquisition with a view to aggrandizement, which mingles so much in the transactions of nations, seem to have had no effect in regard to them. From the facts which have come to our knowledge there is good cause to believe that their enemy has lost forever all dominion over them; that Greece will become again an independent nation. That she may obtain that rank is the object of our most ardent wishes.
It was stated at the commencement of the last session that a great effort was then making in Spain and Portugal to improve the condition of the people of those countries, and that it appeared to be conducted with extraordinary moderation. It need scarcely be remarked that the result has been so far very different from what was then anticipated. Of events in that quarter of the globe, with which we have so much intercourse and from which we derive our origin, we have always been anxious and interested spectators.
The citizens of the United States cherish sentiments the most friendly in favor of the liberty and happiness of their fellow men on that side of the Atlantic. In the wars of the European powers in matters relating to themselves we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with our policy so to do.
It is only when our rights are invaded or seriously menaced that we resent injuries or make preparation for our defense. With the movements in this hemisphere we are of necessity more immediately connected, and by causes which must be obvious to all enlightened and impartial observers.
The political system of the allied powers is essentially different in this respect from that of America. This difference proceeds from that which exists in their respective Governments; and to the defense of our own, which has been achieved by the loss of so much blood and treasure, and matured by the wisdom of their most enlightened citizens, and under which we have enjoyed unexampled felicity, this whole nation is devoted.
We owe it, therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere, but with the Governments who have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States.
In the war between those new Governments and Spain we declared our neutrality at the time of their recognition, and to this we have adhered, and shall continue to adhere, provided no change shall occur which, in the judgment of the competent authorities of this Government, shall make a corresponding change on the part of the United States indispensable to their security.
The late events in Spain and Portugal show that Europe is still unsettled. Of this important fact no stronger proof can be adduced than that the allied powers should have thought it proper, on any principle satisfactory to themselves, to have interposed by force in the internal concerns of Spain. To what extent such interposition may be carried, on the same principle, is a question in which all independent powers whose governments differ from theirs are interested, even those most remote, and surely none more so than the United States.
Our policy in regard to Europe, which was adopted at an early stage of the wars which have so long agitated that quarter of the globe, nevertheless remains the same, which is, not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its powers; to consider the government de facto as the legitimate government for us; to cultivate friendly relations with it, and to preserve those relations by a frank, firm, and manly policy, meeting in all instances the just claims of every power, submitting to injuries from none.
But in regard to those continents circumstances are eminently and conspicuously different. It is impossible that the allied powers should extend their political system to any portion of either continent without endangering our peace and happiness; nor can anyone believe that our southern brethren, if left to themselves, would adopt it of their own accord. It is equally impossible, therefore, that we should behold such interposition in any form with indifference. If we look to the comparative strength and resources of Spain and those new Governments, and their distance from each other, it must be obvious that she can never subdue them. It is still the true policy of the United States to leave the parties to themselves, in the hope that other powers will pursue the same course.


SOURCE (on-line):
This monograph is an adapted excerpt from the author's e-book entitled
κατά τής Οθωμανικής Αυτοκρατορίας τό 1821:
ch. 15, pp. 80-105.
[freely downloadable e-book, at the academic site of the author here:

Σχόλια

  1. Ok! Now I am starting to understand why the Greeks have developed a love-and-hate relationship with the U.S. (but with lots of love indeed!).

    By the way, a question to anybody who might know the answer: Has ever the Greek Army engaged in any fight or mere skirmish (however minor) against American troops in the last 200 years, under any circumstances (as it did against French and British troops in mid-19th century, German and Austrian troops in WWI, Russian troops in post-WWI, German and Italian armies in WWII, and China in the post-WWII Korean war)? It seems that the Greeks have been prone to raising arms against every big power on earth. But what about the U.S. though?

    Thanks to any one who might shed some light on this (I hope reasonable) question.

    Robert Fray
    robertfray1965@yahoo.com

    ΑπάντησηΔιαγραφή
  2. To ROBERT FRAY: Up to 1973, the answer to your question would be rather easy and straightforward: For 152 consecutive years, in 1821-1973, there had been neither an incident of military confrontation, nor even a THREAT (explicit or implicit) of such confrontation between any unit of the Greek Army and any unit of the U.S. Armed Forces. Thus the (philamerican) "love" part of what you characterize as "love-and-hate relationship".

    Still, in 1974, amidst the mess of the CIA-instigated military coup d'état (June 15, 1974) of the Greek junta (1967-1974) against the elected President of democratic Cyprus Archbishop Makarios, and during the ensued invasion of Cyprus by the Armed Forces of Turkey (June 20- August 18, 1974) assumedly to re-establish constitutional order in the island, there were some THREATS (both explicit and implicit) of military intervention of British and American armed forces against the Armed Forces of Greece: For example, If the Greek Air Force sent its squadron of (18) Phantoms F-4 on a mission to Cyprus to destroy the Turkish fleet in a few hours (Turkey had no such high-performance heavy-load long-range fighter-bombers at the time), then the Greek squadron would be intercepted by the British, probably jointly with the Americans (the first based on the two English military bases in Cyprus, and the second operating from the U.S. Navy's 6th fleet, which has been deployed in eastern Mediterranean to that end then), which might probably explain the "mysterious" inactivity of the Greek Air Force during the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, and the military defeat of Greece in 1974.

    All the events and aspects of this issue--involvement of the CIA in a MILITARY coup that provoked the INVASION of Turkey, as well as THREATS, explicit (Britain) and implicit (the U.S.), against the Armed Forces of Greece, in protection of the Turkish Fleet--are only now starting to come to the fore, as the so-called "CYPRUS FILE", is gradually becoming public (it was classified until 2017). Thus the (anti-american) "hate" part of what you characterize as "love-and-hate relationship".

    You might start, perharps, your personal research on the issue with the following primary sources:

    Official records of the US Government ( DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 11444):
    https://2001-2009.state.gov/documents/organization/96610.pdf

    Cyprus 1974 files:
    http://www.parliament.cy/el/significant-papers/%CF%86%CE%AC%CE%BA%CE%B5%CE%BB%CE%BF%CF%82-%CE%BA%CF%8D%CF%80%CF%81%CE%BF%CF%85

    In any case, the history of the Greek defeat in Cyprus in 1974, has not been written yet.

    John D. Pappas

    ΑπάντησηΔιαγραφή
  3. Thanks for the info. I hope the Cypriot or the Greek state uploads the documents, especially those pertaining to Angloamerican or NATO involvement (Cyprus 1974), with official translations in English for interested historians to read.

    Robert Fray
    robertfray1965@yahoo.com

    ΑπάντησηΔιαγραφή

Δημοσίευση σχολίου

Ο σχολιασμός του αναγνώστη (ενημερωμένου η μη) είναι το καύσιμο για το ιστολόγιο αυτό, έτσι σας προτρέπουμε να μας πείτε την γνώμη σας. Τα σχόλια οφείλουν να είναι κόσμια, εντός θέματος και γραμμένα με Ελληνικούς χαρακτήρες (όχι greeklish και κεφαλαία).

Καλό είναι όποιος θέλει να διατηρεί την ανωνυμία του να χρησιμοποιεί ένα ψευδώνυμο έτσι ώστε σε περίπτωση διαλόγου, να γίνεται αντιληπτό ποιος είπε τι. Κάθε σχόλιο το οποίο είναι υβριστικό η εμπαθές, θα διαγράφεται αυτομάτως.

"Encompass worlds but do not try to encompass me..."

Walt Whitmann

Όλα τα θέματα του ιστολογίου

"υγρό πυρ" 1821 19η Μαίου 25η Μαρτίου 28η Οκτωβρίου 1940 4η Αυγούστου α Α΄ Παγκόσμιος πόλεμος Αβράαμ Λίνκολν Άγγελος Έβερτ Άγγελος Σικελιανός Αγγλία Άγιο Όρος Αδαμάντιος Ανδρουτσόπουλος Αδαμάντιος Κοραής Αθανάσιος Ευταξίας Αθανάσιος Τσακάλωφ Αιγαίο Αιγαίο Ελληνική θάλασσα Αίγινα Αισχύλος Ακρόπολη Αλβανία Αλεξάνδρεια Αλέξανδρος Ζαϊμης Αλέξανδρος Κορυζής Αλέξανδρος Κουμουνδούρος Αλέξανδρος Μαυροκορδάτος Αλέξανδρος Οθωναίος Αλέξανδρος Παπάγος Αλέξανδρος Παπαδιαμάντης Αλέξανδρος Παπαναστασίου Αλέξανδρος Ρίζος Ραγκαβής Αλέξανδρος Σακελαρίου Αλέξανδρος Υψηλάντης Αλέξανδρος Χατζηκυριάκος Αλεξάντρ Σολτζενίτσιν Αμερικανικός Εμφύλιος πόλεμος Αναγέννηση Αναξίμανδρος ο Μιλήσιος Αναστάσιος Παπούλας Ανατολική Ρωμυλία Ανδρέας Γ. Παπανδρέου Ανδρέας Καρκαβίτσας Ανδρέας Λόντος Ανδρέας Μεταξάς Ανδρέας Μιαούλης Ανδρέας Μιχαλακόπουλος Ανδρέας Τζίμας Άνθιμος Γαζής Αννα Κομνηνή Άννα Κομνηνή Αννίβας Αντάντ Αντιβενιζελισμός αντισημιτισμός Αντόνιο Γκράμσι Αντώνης Σαμαράς Απεργίες Αποικιοκρατία Άραβες Αρβανίτες Άρειος Πάγος Άρης Βελουχιώτης Αριστείδης ο Αθηναίος Αριστοτέλης Αριστοτέλης Ωνάσης Αρχαία Αθήνα Αρχαία Ελληνική Ιστορία - Ρωμαιοκρατία Αρχαία Ελληνική Φιλοσοφία Αρχαία Σπάρτη Αρχαιοκαπηλεία Αρχαιολογία Αρχιεπίσκοπος Δαμασκηνός Αρχιεπίσκοπος Χρύσανθος Αρχιμίδης Αστρονομία Αστυνομία Αυστρία Αυτοκράτορας Ηράκλειος Αφρική Αχαϊκή Συμπολιτεία β Β΄ Παγκόσμιος πόλεμος Βαλκάνια βασανιστήρια Βασίλειος Τσίχλης Βασιλιάς Αλέξανδρος Α΄ Βασιλιάς Γεώργιος Α΄ Βασιλιάς Γεώργιος Β΄ Βασιλιάς Κωνσταντίνος Α΄ Βασιλιάς Κωνσταντίνος Β΄ Βασιλιάς Όθων Α΄ Βασιλιάς Παύλος Α΄ Βασιλιάς Φίλιππος Β΄ Βενιαμίν Λέσβιος Βιβλία και Βιβλιοθήκες Βιβλιοκρισίες Βιέννη Βιετνάμ Βιογραφίες Βλάσης Γαβριηλίδης Βουλγαρία Βυζαντινή Ιστορία γ Γαβριήλ Μιχαήλ Δημητριάδης Γαλλία Γαλλική Επανάσταση Γαριβάλδι Γελιογραφίες Γενοκτονία των Αρμενίων Γενοκτονία των Ελλήνων του Πόντου Γερμανία Γεώργιος (Πλήθων) Γεμιστός Γεώργιος Α. Παπανδρέου Γεώργιος Βλάχος Γεώργιος Γρίβας (Διγενής) Γεώργιος Ζησιμόπουλος Γεώργιος Θεοτόκης Γεώργιος Κάνιγκ Γεώργιος Καραϊσκάκης Γεώργιος Καρτάλης Γεώργιος Καφαντάρης Γεώργιος Κονδύλης Γεώργιος Κουντουριώτης Γεώργιος Λεοναρδόπουλος Γεώργιος Παπαδόπουλος Γεώργιος Παπανδρέου (GAP) Γεώργιος Πωπ Γεώργιος Ράλλης Γεώργιος Σεφέρης Γεώργιος Σταύρου Γεώργιος Στρέιτ Γεώργιος Τσολάκογλου Γιάννης Ιωαννίδης Γιάννης Ψυχάρης Γιόζιφ Μπροζ (Τίτο) Γιουγκοσλαβία Γιώργης Σιάντος Γιώργος Ρωμανός Γκουλάγκς Γλώσσα και καθημερινός βίος των Ελλήνων διαχρονικά Γράμμος - Βίτσι Γρηγόρης Φαράκος Γρηγόριος Δίκαιος (Παπαφλέσσας) Γρηγόριος Ξενόπουλος δ Δαρδανέλλια Δεκεμβριανά - Εμφύλιος πόλεμος (1944-1949) Δέσποινα Κούρτη Δημήτρης Παρτσαλίδης Δημήτριος Αναγνωστόπουλος Δημήτριος Βούλγαρης Δημήτριος Γούναρης Δημήτριος Ιωαννίδης Δημήτριος Καλλέργης Δημήτριος Μάξιμος Δημήτριος Ράλλης Δημήτριος Υψηλάντης Δημήτριος Ψαρρός Δημοκρατικός Στρατός Ελλάδος (ΔΣΕ) Δημοσθένης Δημοψήφισμα δημοψήφισμα 1924 Διατροφή Διεθνές Νομισματικό Ταμείο (Δ.Ν.Τ.) Δικαιοσύνη Διονύσιος Σολωμός Διπλωματία δοσιλογισμός δουλεμπόριο Δύση Δωδεκάνησα Ε.Ρ.Ε. ΕΔΕΣ Εθνικά Δάνεια Εθνική αντίσταση Εθνική τράπεζα Εθνικό Απελευθερωτικό Μέτωπο (Ε.Α.Μ.) Εθνικό Απελευθερωτικό Μέτωπο (ΕΑΜ) Εθνικός Διχασμός (1914-1918) Εθνικός Συναγερμός Εθνοσυνέλευση ΕΚΚΑ Εκκλησιαστική Ιστορία ΕΛΑΣ Ελβετία ΕΛΔΥΚ Ελευθέριος Βενιζέλος Ελληνική λογοτεχνία Ελληνική Οικονομική Ιστορία Ελληνική Οικονομική κρίση Ελληνική Παιδεία Ελληνική Παλιγγενεσία (1821 - 1832) Ελληνική Παράδοση Έλληνικό Έθνος Ελληνικός Εμφύλιος πόλεμος Ελληνικός στρατός Ελληνισμός Ελληνισμός της Αμερικής Ελληνοτουρκικές σχέσεις Ελληνοτουρκικός πόλεμος 1897 Ελλήνων Πάσχα Εμμανουήλ Μπενάκης Εμμανουήλ Ξάνθος Εμμανουήλ Παπάς Εμμανουήλ Ρέπουλης Εμμανουήλ Ροϊδης Εμμανουήλ Τομπάζης Εμμανουήλ Τσουδερός Εμπόριο Ενιαία Δημοκρατική Αριστερά (Ε.Δ.Α.) Ένωση Κέντρου ΕΟΚ ΕΟΚΑ Α΄ ΕΟΚΑ Β΄ Επανάσταση στο Γουδή Επανάσταση στο Γουδί Α΄ και Β΄ Βαλκανικός πόλεμος (1909-1914) Επέτειος Επίκουρος Επιτάφιος Ερατοσθένης Ερυθρός Σταυρός ΕΣΣΔ Ευάγγελος Αβέρωφ Ευάγγελος Λεμπέσης Ευεργέτες Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση Ευρωπαικός Διαφωτισμός εφημερίδα "Καθημερινή" Η γυναίκα στην Ιστορία Η δίκη των "εξ" Ήθη και έθιμα Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες της Αμερικής (Η.Π.Α.) Ήπειρος Ηράκλειτος Ηρακλής Θεσσαλονίκης Ηρόδοτος Θαλής ο ΜΙλήσιος Θέατρο Θεμιστοκλής Θεμιστοκλής Σοφούλης Θεόδωρος Δηλιγιάννης Θεόδωρος Κολοκοτρώνης Θεόδωρος Πάγκαλος Θεόδωρος Πάγκαλος (ο νεότερος) Θεόδωρος Τουρκοβασίλης Θεόφιλος Καΐρης Θερμοπύλες Θεσσαλονίκη Θουκυδίδης Θράκη Θρασύβουλος Τσακαλώτος Θρησκεία Θωρηκτό Αβέρωφ Ι.Β.Δ. Ιαπωνία Ιατρική Ιερή Συμμαχία Ιερός Λόχος Ιλιάδα Ίμια Ιουλιανή κρίση του ΄65 Ιούλιος Βέρν Ιπποκράτης ο Κώος Ισλάμ Ισοκράτης Ισπανικός Εμφύλιος πόλεμος Ιστορία Ιστορία της Αλβανίας Ιστορία της Ελληνικής αεροπορίας Ιστορία της Κρήτης Ιστορία του Αθλητισμού Ιταλία Ιωάννης (Γενναίος) Κολοκοτρώνης Ιωάννης Γκούρας Ιωάννης Δεμέστιχας Ιωάννης Καποδίστριας Ιωάννης Κωλέττης Ιωάννης Μακρυγιάννης Ιωάννης Μεταξάς Ιωάννης Μιχαήλ Ιωάννης Παπακωνσταντίνου Ιωάννης Συκουτρής Ιωάννης Τσαγκαρίδης Ιωάννης Τσιμισκής Ιωάννινα Ίων Δραγούμης Ιωνική Επανάσταση Κ. Θ. Δημαράς Καλαμάτα Κανέλος Δεληγιάννης Καρλ Γιουνγκ Καρλ Μαρξ Κάρολος Παπούλιας Καρχηδόνα κατεχόμενα της Κύπρου Κατοχή Κατοχικά Δάνεια Κίμων ο Αθηναίος Κίνα Κίνημα του Ρομαντισμού κινηματογράφος Κινηματογράφος και Ιστορία Κοινωνία των Εθνών (Κ.τ.Ε.) Κολλυβάδες Κόμμα Φιλελευθέρων Κομμουνισμός Κομνηνός Πυρομάγλου Κοράνιο Κόρινθος Κουμουνδούρος - Τρικούπης - Θεοτόκης (1865-1909) Κύθηρα Κυπριακή Ιστορία Κυριάκος Κατσιμάνης Κύριλλος Λούκαρις Κωνσταντίνος Δεμερτζής Κωνσταντίνος Καβάφης Κωνσταντίνος Καναρης Κωνσταντίνος Καραθεοδωρή Κωνσταντίνος Καραμανλής Κωνσταντίνος Καραμανλής (ο νεώτερος) Κωνσταντίνος Λινάρδος Κωνσταντίνος Μανιαδάκης Κωνσταντίνος Μητσοτάκης Κωνσταντίνος Παλαιολόγος ΙΑ΄ Κωνσταντίνος Παπαρρηγόπουλος Κωνσταντίνος Σημίτης Κωνσταντίνος Σμολένσκι Κωνσταντίνος Τσαλδάρης Κωνσταντίνος Φωτιάδης Κωνσταντινούπολη Κως Κώστας Βάρναλης Κώστας Περρίκος Κωστής Παλαμάς ΛΑ.Ο.Σ Λαθρομετανάστευση Λαικό Κόμμα Λαμία Λατινική Αμερική Λεονίντ Τρότσκι Λέσβος Λεωνίδας Παρασκευόπουλος Λόγιος Ερμής Λόρδος Βύρων Λουτράκι Λύσανδρος Μαζική πολιτική προπαγάνδα Μακάριος Μακεδονία Μακεδονικό Ζήτημα Μακεδονικός Αγώνας Μακεδονομάχοι Μάνη Μάο Τσε Τουνγκ Μαραθώνας Μάρκος Βαφειάδης Μάρκος Μπότσαρης Μάτζικερτ Μεγάλη Βρετανία Μεγάλη Ελλάδα (Magna Grecia) Μέγαρο Μαξίμου Μέγας Αλέξανδρος Μέγας Αλέξανδρος ο Μακεδών Μέγας Θεοδόσιος Μέγας Κωνσταντίνος Μελέτης Βασιλείου Μεσαίωνας Μέση Ανατολή Μεσόγειος Μεσολόγγι Μεσοπόλεμος (1922-1941) Μεσσήνη Μεσσηνίας Μεταπολεμική Ελληνική Ιστορία (1949-1974) Μέττερνιχ Μίκης Θεοδωράκης Μίκης Πρωτοπαπαδάκης Μικρά Ασία μικρασιατική εκστρατεία και καταστροφή παρωδία δίκης και εκτέλεση των έξι (1918-1922) Μιλτιάδης ο Αθηναίος Μιλτιάδης Πορφυρογέννης Μιχαήλ Ψελλός Μνημείο Μοροζίνι Μουσολίνι Μπενιζέλος Ρούφος Μυστικές υπηρεσίες ναζισμός Νάξος Ναπολέων Βοναπάρτης Ναπολέων Ζέρβας Ναυαρίνο Ναύπακτος Ναύπλιο Ναυτική Ιστορία Νέα Δημοκρατία Νεοκλής Σαρρής Νεότουρκοι Νικήτας Σταματελόπουλος Νικηφόρος Φωκάς Νικίας Νικόλαος Δημητρακόπουλος Νικόλαος Λεωτσάκος Νικόλαος Πλαστήρας Νικόλαος Πολίτης Νικόλαος Στράτος Νίκος Ζαχαριάδης Νίκος Καζαντζάκης Νίκος Μπελογιάννης Νίκος Νικολούδης Νίτσε Ξάνθη Ξενοφών Οδυσσέας Ανδρούτσος Οδυσσέας Ελύτης Οδυσσέας Ιάλεμος Οδύσσεια Οθωμανική Αυτοκρατορία Οθωνική περίοδος (1832-1864) Οικουμενικό Πατριαρχείο Όλα τα άρθρα με χρονολογική σειρά ομάδα των "Ιαπώνων" Όμηρος ομοφυλοφιλία Οργανισμός ηνωμένων Εθνών (Ο.Η.Ε.) Οργάνωση "Χ" Ορθοδοξία π. Κύριλλος Κεφαλόπουλος ΠΑ. ΣΟ. Κ. Παγκόσμιος Ιστορία Παλαιών Πατρών Γερμανός Παναγής Τσαλδάρης Παναγιώτης Δαγκλής Παναγιώτης Δεμέστιχας Παναγιώτης Κανελλόπουλος Πάνος Κορωναίος Πάτρα Πατριάρχης Γρηγόριος Ε΄ Παύλος Γύπαρης Παύλος Κουντουριώτης Παύλος Μελάς Παυσανίας Παυσανίας Κατσώτας Παυσανίας ο περιηγητής ΠΕΑΝ Πειραιάς πειρατεία Πεισίστρατος Πελοποννησιακός πόλεμος Περικλής Περικλής Αργυρόπουλος Περικλής Γιαννόπουλος Περικλής Δεληγιάννης Περιοδικά Ιστορίας Περσικοί πόλεμοι Πετρέλαια στο Αιγαίο Πετρόμπεης Μαυρομιχάλης Πέτρος Γαρουφαλιάς Πέτρος Μακρής - Στάϊκος Πέτρος Πρωτοπαπαδάκης Πλάτων Πλούταρχος Ποίηση και αισθητική Πόλεμος των Μπόερς Πολιτικαντισμός εν Ελλάδι πολιτική δολοφονία Πολιτική Ιστορία Πολωνία Πόντος Πρίγκιπας Ανδρέας προπαγάνδα πρόσφυγες προσωκρατικοί φιλόσοφοι Προτεινόμενα Πρωτογενείς Ιστορικές πηγές πρωτόκολλο Πολίτη-Calfoff Πύρρος της Ηπείρου Ρήγας Παλαμίδης Ρήγας Φερραίος ριζοσπάστης Ρόδος Ρωμαϊκή Αυτοκρατορία Ρώμη Ρωμηοσύνη Ρωσία Ρωσικο κόμμα Σάββας Γκαλιμαρίδης Σάμος Σαντόρε Σανταρόζα Σαντορίνη ΣΚΑΪ Σκάκι Σκωτία Σόλων Σοφοκλής Βενιζέλος Σοφοκλής Δούσμανης Σπυρίδων Μαρκεζίνης Σπυρίδων Τρικούπης Σταλινισμός Σταυροφορίες Σταφιδικό Ζήτημα Στέφανος Δραγούμης Στέφανος Σαράφης Στέφανος Σκουλούδης Στέφανος Στεφανόπουλος Στράβων Στρατής Μυριβίλης Στρατιωτικά κινήματα Στρατιωτική Ιστορία Στρατιωτικό καθεστώς Ιωαννίδη Στυλιανός Γονατάς Στυλιανός Χούτας Σύμφωνο Ρίμπεντροπ - Μολότωφ Συνθήκη της Λοζάννης Συνθήκη των Σεβρών συντάξεις ΣΥΡΙΖΑ Σύχρονη Ελληνική Ιστορία - Μεταπολίτευση (1974- ) Σωκράτης Σώματα Ασφαλείας Τα κείμενα του "φιλίστωρος" (Ι. Β. Δ.) Ταγίπ Ερντογάν Τάγματα ασφαλείας Τείχος του Βερολίνου τεκτονισμός Τέχνες Τεχνολογία το παιχνίδι στην Ιστορία Τοπική Ιστορία Τουρκία Τουρκοκρατία (1453-1821) Τράπεζα της Ελλάδος Τράπεζες Τριπλή Κατοχή της Ελλαδος και Αντίσταση (1941-1944) Τριπολιτσά Τσαούς Αντών (Φωστερίδης) Ύδρα Υποβρύχιο Παπανικολής υπόθεση ΑΣΠΙΔΑ Υφαλοκρυπίδα Φαίδων Γκιζίκης Φαλμεράγιερ Φανάρι Φασισμός Φιλελληνισμός Φιλία Φιλική Εταιρεία Φιλολογικά και άλλα δοκίμια Φιλοποίμην Φιλορθόδοξη Εταιρεία Φιλοσοφία Φιλοσοφία της ζωής και της Ιστορίας Φλωρεντία Φλώρινα Φραγκοκρατία Φωκίων Φωτογραφικό Οδοιπορικό Χαλκιδική Χαράλαμπος Κατσιμήτρος Χαράλαμπος Τσερούλης Χαράτσι Χαρίλαος Τρικούπης Χαρίλαος Φλωράκης Χάτι Χουμαγιούν Χίτλερ Χούντα Χρεοκοπία Χρηματιστήριο χριστιανικό ολοκαύτωμα Χριστόδουλος Τσιγάντες Χριστούγεννα Χρυσόστομος Σμύρνης Χωροφυλακή Ψαρά ψυχολογία Ψυχρός Πόλεμος Articles in English CIA http://www.istorikathemata.com/ John Iatrides K.K.E. KGB Mεσσήνη Robert Bruce Slider William Wallas Winston Churchil
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